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We consider the problem between an employer and a research employee who has not finished a 
research project in time because of a lack of an innovative idea. The research project yields money in 
case of finishing it. The decision to be made is whether or not the researcher gets a contract 
prolongation. Giving him or her a prolongation is associated with a positive expected return for the 
employer, which may or may not exceed the expected costs of the prolongation. A principal-agent 
problem is formulated, in which the probability of success is determined by the research time allotted 
and the effort of the agent. The agent decides upon his effort given the salary (reduction), the share of 
research time, and the length of the prolongation. The employer takes a decision on these variables, 
knowing the agent’s first-order condition with respect to effort. For the decision on the length of the 
contract prolongation it is of crucial importance what impact the research-time share (or the teaching 
load) has on the probability density of success and on the effort chosen by the agent. All theoretically 
possible outcomes are discussed. In particular the decision of the faculty of economics at Maastricht 
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 1. Introduction 
 
In a world with heterogeneous individuals with ordinal utility functions of some individuals, 
constitutions of all institutions are political compromises. The constitution of a nation state 
can allocate rights to the central or the individual level or to some other level in between. 
The political compromises may change over time such that rights are allocated to different 
institutions than before the change. As a consequence those getting the rights for some 
decisions will have to find their own way how to make there decisions. In short, after a 
change in the allocation of rights new problems may rise. In this paper we consider an 
example of such a case because the consequences of constitutional change should be 
taken into account when deciding upon it. 
Recent constitutional change in the Netherlands has shifted rights from the level of 
the central state to that of the provinces and municipalities, from the level of ministries to 
the level of universities, faculties or even departments and from rigid laws to the discretion 
of commissions. One such example is the right to decide on the prolongation of contracts 
concerning doctoral dissertations. In earlier times this decision problem was not left to 
faculties but rather decided upon by law. Recently it has been shifted to the discretion of 
the faculties. This means that constitutional change has transformed a central government 
decision into a principal-agent problem, where the faculty is the principal and PHD 
students are the agents. In this paper we will consider this problem in detail. 
           It is a feature of research contracts that a fixed payment per project has to be paid 
if the project is finished in time. One example from the Netherlands is doctoral dissertation 
premiums paid by the government as support of basic scientific research. The uncertain 
outcome with respect to the success of the doctoral dissertation as well as other projects 
poses an interesting problem for the contract length of the PHD student who normally gets 
a contract for four years. If the student does not finish his dissertation within the time 
allotted, the faculty will loose the prize paid by the government unless the student can 
organize some other source of financing, which will not be possible in general. If the 
faculty offers the student a contract prolongation, there will probably be a dissertation after 
some time and therefore the government prize can be gained with some likelihood. The 
problem for the faculty will then be to decide how long to extend the contract, at what Thomas Ziesemer 
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salary reduction and which labour time. An essential point in the problem is that the 
researcher has an impact on the probability of success through his effort and the faculty 
has an impact on it through the labour time requested for teaching, the salary and the 
length of the prolongation. 
 As a faculty will not like to make a new decision in each individual case it will form 
an idea of an average student having this problem and set up rules that can credibly be 
announced beforehand. The student knowing the rules for a potential prolongation of his 
contract can take this into account during his behaviour in the first part of the game before 
the prolongation gets relevant. We consider here only the making of the rules for the 
second part of the game.
1 More specifically, we consider the behaviour of the researcher 
and the derivation of administrative rules by the faculty as a principal-agent problem. The 
scope of the problem, however, may be much broader than just the university research. 
The essence is that the principal receives a prize for successfully finishing a project in 
time, and the agent has an impact on the probability through his effort. Obviously, the 
Dutch situation with faculties having the right to choose these rules and having an 
incentive to do so is different from the German situation where the rules are determined 
by law. In particular there is no reason to worry about a potential inflation of dissertations 
because of the payment of a prize by the government. Dutch institutions are set up in a 
way that this is avoided, because the prize does not go to the supervisors or (Co-) 
promoters of a dissertation and they cannot be members of the commission, which judges 
about the dissertation and is installed by the dean. 
In the model presented in section 2, the representative researcher maximizes (in 
section 3) his expected utility for the duration of the contract. He can increase the 
probability of successfully finishing his project by choosing a higher level of effort, which 
produces some disutility. The impact of the employers￿ choice variables on the effort of the 
researcher is analyzed in section 4. The employer is assumed to know this behaviour and 
determines (in section 5) the salary, the working hours for research and the length of time 
for which the contract is prolonged. His objective is to maximize the expected return minus 
that part of the prize that is used for research. Section 6 sums up and concludes. A list of 
                                                            
1 An interesting paper on the determination of fixed expiration dates for the first period in cases of individual contracts 





abbreviations can be found at the end of the paper. We discuss related literature during 
the presentation of the model. 
 
2. The model 
In a more formal way the problem described above can be presented as follows. At time 
zero the regular contract of the researcher expires and prolongation may begin. At time T 
researcher￿s contract prolongation expires. T has to be decided upon by the principal 
(employer, research institute). The agent determines the effort, e, in periods 0 < t < T 
through maximization of utility U derived from the salary (1-s) S and from the effort. S is 
the last full salary of the researcher during regular contract length fixed by the government 
(thus, till zero). This can be set equal to one in the following when helpful. 1 - s is the 
percentage of the full salary paid after 0 till T or the point in time of success if reached 
earlier. For the mere sake of simplicity it is assumed that the income is completely used 
for consumption. Utility has to be weighed by the likelihood that research will be finished 
successfully. This probability depends on the labour time of the researcher, x, and on the 
effort e. Dependence on e implies moral hazard if the effort is not observable for the 
employer or third parties. As a consequence the researcher cannot insure against failure 
because he has a non-verifiable influence on the likelihood of success. We specify 
 
P is the probability function for research success (and e
-hv for failure) with random time 
variable t (and ⊗  its realization), and a concave function h, with properties h1, h2 > 0, h11, 
h22 < 0, h21 >=< 0, h (0,0) = 0. The derivative of the probability function with respect to 
time t is                                                      
 
 
p is the density function of t for success and p/(1-P) = hv’ is the generalized hazard rate 
(see Kamien/Schwarz, 1980): the probability of research success in t conditional on no 
) ( ) , ( 1
t v e x h e P
− − =
) ( ) , ( ) ( ' ) , (
t v e x h e t v e x h p
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4 
research success until t. When the researcher succeeds at some point in time ⊗  < T, that 
is before the prolonged contract expires, he receives his full salary again and returns to 
some standard effort ē. This provides him with utility U 
2, where the upper index indicates 
just another phase of life. It is attractive to strive for success at ⊗  < T if U 
2 ≥ E(U). 
2 With 
utility function U [(1-s)S, -e] of the employee with properties U1, U2 > 0, U22 < 0 and the 
discount rate ρ , the objective function for the household is  
 
 
Henceforth it is taken for granted that the constraint U 
2 ≥ E(U) is fulfilled and not 
binding. Moreover, there is the outside option of giving up the effort to write a doctoral 
dissertation or finishing some other project, which is assumed to yield utility U 
0. With S (1-
s) as salary costs and q (1-x) as return from education, the employer hopes to get F, the 
prize for research success, which he gets if the researcher succeeds. The employers 
expected net return is expressed as follows 
 
 
Labour time x is assumed to have an impact on the probability of success of the research 
and on revenues from teaching. Neither leisure nor an impact of x on the prize F is 
assumed to exist. More research time decreases the time a researcher is available for 
teaching or administration, which yields q per unit of time. On the side of the researcher it 
is assumed that he can react with his effort on changes in the labour time imposed by the 
principal. 
The following cases for the part v (t) of the probability function can be distinguished 
(see Kamien and Schwarz, 1980): v (t) = t and v’ = 1 for the exponential distribution, v (t) = 
                                                            
2 In terms of signaling language this means that there are only two possible signals that can appear at each period t: 
‘Success’ or ‘no success’. Once the signal ‘success’ appears the game is essentially over and the researcher gets his 
reward U
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w and v’ = wt 
w-1 for the Weibull distribution and v (t) = e 
wt - 1 and v’ = we 
wt for the 
extreme value distribution, where the e is Euler￿s e, not the effort used before and later. 
 
3. The problem of the representative researcher household 
 
The representative researcher household is assumed to  
 
The first-order conditions for this problem, ∂L/∂e = 0, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T requires:      
 
 
Dividing by v’e 
-hv and rewriting h2 outside the brackets yields (for 0 ≤ t ≤ T) 
 
 
Expected marginal disutility from effort must be outweighed by the marginal increase in 
the density of the success probability, where the conditional success probability h is 
increased and the probability of failure e 
-hv is decreased and the former must outweigh 
the latter, such that an interior solution requires 1 - hv > 0. Growth of v over time, which 
follows from the assumptions on v, will drive h down as hv approaches 1 (or earlier) and 
thus either x or e or both ￿ the arguments in h - will decrease from some time onwards. 
For constant or growing given x, e would decrease. However, x will be determined by the 
principal and may go down as well.  
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6 
As all terms are negative according to the concavity assumptions on U and h this 
condition is fulfilled and (1) has a unique solution.
3 
4. The principal's comparative static impact on the representative 
agent’s effort  
 
The contract prolongation being made to make an uncertain outcome successful, the 
researcher household has an impact on the probability of success through his choice of e. 
This is the moral hazard problem, which excludes the possibility that there will be an 
insurance against the failure in research unless the effort of each researcher is observable 
by the insurer and verifiable for third parties. In the next step it is investigated which 
values in (1), given from the employer, influence e positively or negatively.  
 
          123 123        123        123 
               +            -             sign h 21            -      
  
All impacts of x run via h or h2. The first term in brackets says that higher research time x 
increases the expected disutility from effort because the conditional success probability is 
increased, thus providing a disincentive for effort. The second term says that higher 
research time x increases (decreases) the influence of higher effort on the probability 
density of success if h21 >(<) 0, providing an incentive for higher (lower) effort. The third 
term says that higher x increases the speed with which hv is running against 1 and 
increases the speed with which the probability density of success declines, thus providing 
a disincentive for effort. If h21 < 0 all terms are negative and effort decreases as a reaction 
on more research time. 
For the impact of the salary on effort we receive 
 
                                                            
3 By implication we do not have to bother separately about convex distribution function conditions and the monotone 
likelihood ratio condition (see Gravelle and Rees chap.22.E).  
[] {} ) 2 ( 0 ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( 1 2 21 1 2
1 > < − + − + − ⋅ − = ∂






                123 123   14243 
                     +         +(-)              +  
 
The impact of a higher salary on effort is positive if U21≤ 0.
4 Thus, there is no positive 
impact of salary reduction on effort, but a negative one on utility. For U21 > 0 the effect is 
ambiguous. 
As time goes by, the cumulative probability of failure decreases because of the 
time impact in v. The ceteris paribus effect (i.e. at constant salary and research time) of t 
on e is 
 
 
The interpretation of (4) is that you distribute effort parallel to the difficulty (low cumulated 
probability) of success: the higher the probability of success, the lower the effort, or, in 
other words, people get lazy because time works for them. Because the partial effect of x 
on e was also ambiguous it is not certain that choice of x can help the employer-principal 
to counteract this effect of time. If h21 < 0, reduction of the research time increases the 
effort. Falling effort can also be counteracted by an increasing salary (lower s) if U21 < 0 
(sufficient). Terminating the contract at time T limits the possible fall in effort.
5  
 
5. The employer’s problem 
 
The employer takes (1) into account when maximizing the expected return from the 
research. It should be reemphasized that the employer has an image of a representative 
agent expressed through (1) and too little information or too high information costs to base 
contracts with individual researchers on. The essence of the problem is not one of 
                                                            
4 Stiglitz and Weiss (1983) mention this effect as one of the reasons why termination of contracts may be preferable to 
other reactions on weak performance. 
5 Termination is not imposed to reveal hidden information as in Sen (1996). Incentive effects of termination are also 
absent – except in regard to timing of course - because PHD contracts end anyway  - with and without success.  
{} ) 3 ( 0 ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 1 21
1 < > − + − − = − ∂
∂ − hv h U h U A s
e
{} ) 4 ( 0 ) ' ( 2
1 < − − = ∂




revealing private information on hidden action or information of the agent through 
monitoring
6 or other mechanisms, but rather one of writing rules to be announced to and 
designed for an image of a representative agent.
7 His problem
8 is to 
 
The optimal termination for the principal requires for t =T 
 
 
The optimal contract termination from the point of view of the risk-neutral employer is 
reached when expected returns of the period equal costs.
9 As h approaches 1/v, e 
￿hv 
approaches e 
-1 and hv’ approaches v’/v which approaches zero as t goes to infinity for the 
exponential distribution and the Weibull distribution and w for the extreme value 
distribution. Thus for the first two special cases of the distribution we can be sure that 
such optimal termination point in time exists because revenue falls below costs for 
positive  1-s  unless revenues from teaching are covering the salaries completely. 
Permanent contracts for one project are unlikely outcomes here. s would have to go to 
unity (no salary). In case of an extreme value function we get Fwe 
-1 - (1-s) S >=< 0 if 
there are no revenues from teaching. This provides a unique solution for s if there is an 
                                                            
6 See Flinn (1997) for an interesting example. Nevertheless we speak of moral hazard here because both the agent and 
the principal have an impact on the probability via h(e,x) and failure cannot be insured against unless third parties 
could observe and verify the effort.  
7 It is a standard assumption in the principal-agents models that effort cannot be observed but the principal knows all 
functions and therefore has perfect information except for the effort. He therefore can calculate the agent’s effort ex-
ante, but not observe it and prove it to third parties because the ex-post outcome is determined not only by the effort 
but also by the random process. There, both parties have an impact on the probability. If the problem is considered with 
the purpose of writing rules, the principal does not need to know the exact utility function of an agent but just needs a 
subjective idea of these preferences.   
8 In general the principal’s problem is a classical calculus of variation problem (see Ross 1973). However, in the 
problem considered here the random variable appears only at the upper bound of the integral of the agent’s objective 
function. Therefore the hazard rate models have the special form of equation (12) in Ross (1973) where the dynamic 
optimization part drops out.  
9 The termination does not occur without reason as it may in recent government contracts [see Robinson (1996)]. 
[] {}
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interior solution for a termination of the contract. However, corner solutions cannot be 
excluded. 
Maximization with respect to the salary reduction yields 
 
                       14243      123    
                                -                   - (+)    
 
The term in the first pair of square brackets equals ∂e/∂s >=< 0, which has the opposite 
sign of (3). In case of an interior solution with ∂e/∂s < 0, the employer will reduce the full 
salary by a percentage that equalizes his cost reduction and the marginal impact of the 
agent’s effort reduction on the principal’s income as derived in (3) plus the expected 
marginal reduction of utility of the agent. This latter term requires a lower reduction of 
effort compared to the case ￿=0, and therefore a lower salary reduction to assume 
participation of the agent. λ must be positive if the incentive-compatibility constraint is 
binding. Thus, the assumption of maximization of expected returns leads to a reduction of 
researchers’ effort in response to a salary reduction in case of a non-binding participation 
constraint. This possibility should be kept in mind in the transition from a governmental to 
an "entrepreneurial university" as it is modeled here. The effort reduction is a cost for the 
agent, which is caused by the reduction of the salary. If ∂e/∂s < 0 leads even to a negative 
sign of (6) this means that a salary reduction provokes an effort reduction that makes it 
unprofitable to reduce the salary which therefore it set equal to S, i.e. s=0. If ∂e/∂s > 0, the 
additional effort is a return to the principal from the salary reduction. In this case (s)he can 
set a higher salary reduction s (in comparison to the case of a decreased effort). If the 
’larger’ sign of (6) holds and s will equal unity, which will imply that the salary becomes 
zero. This can only be the case if U1(0,-e) < ∞ (necessary).  
Optimal research time provision requires 
 
 
[] ) 6 ( , 0 , 0 ] ' ) , ( ) 1 ( [ ) 1 (
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The first term says that increasing the research time increases the probability of success 
and thus the expected return of the employer-principal. The term in square brackets 
measures the effect of x on e, which was shown to be of unclear sign in (2), the 
comparative static effects on the researchers (agents) optimum, as long as h21 > 0, but of 
negative sign if h21 < 0 (sufficient). In this latter case effort reduction is a cost of increasing 
the research time. The final term indicates an increase in the agents utility, which allows 
for a lower increase in research time x, which in turn softens the decrease of effort if h21 < 
0.  Using (2) for the last expression in (7), this becomes: 
 
[][] ) 8 ( 0 ) 1 ( ' 1 ' 1 1 >=< − + ∂
∂ ⋅ − + −
− − hv e v Uh x
e A hv Fh e v
hv hv µ λ  
 
As 1 - hv was shown to be positive in the first-order condition of the household, λ is 
positive and A is negative because of the household￿s second-order condition, the 
existence of an interior solution for an optimal share of research time requires ∂e/∂x < 0. 
This was shown to be the case for h21 < 0 (sufficient) and for h21 > 0 if the corresponding 
term is not too large. However, for ∂e/∂x < 0 the ’smaller’ sign of (7) and (8) may hold. In 
this case a research time x=0 is chosen, because more research time leads to a very 
strong reduction of effort. Of course, in this case a research contract prolongation will not 
be signed.
10 If ∂e/∂x > 0, however, the ’larger’ sign in (7) and (8) must hold and the 
research time will be x=1, which means that the researcher has a zero teaching load, 
because all terms are positive. In this case of higher effort through a higher share of 
research time full support is given to research.  
For e we find that 
 
 
The derivation of the participation constraint with respect to e is zero according to (1) and 
drops out. This condition confirms 1 - hv > 0 because A < 0 is the second-order condition 
[] 0 1 ' 2 = + − = ∂
∂ A hv Fh v e





from the researcher household. Finally, the derivations with respect to the Lagrange 
multipliers equal zero, which ensures that the agent￿s first-order condition and the 
participation constraint are taken into account.  
At the economics faculty of Maastricht University the commission in charge has 
decided not to allow for prolongations. What may be behind this decision from the 
perspective of the present model? This implies from (5) that T = 0. In all three cases of the 
function we get v = 0 and the exponential term in (5) becomes unity. v’ becomes 1 for the 
exponential distribution, 0 or infinity for the Weibull distribution depending on whether w is 
larger or smaller than unity and w for the extreme value function. A low value of T is 
attractive if v￿ is low (the Weibull case with w larger than unity and the extreme value 
function case with small w). Otherwise, for large v￿, it is attractive to set the time variable 
very high (the case of a Weibull function with w > 1 and an extreme value function with 
high w). For all values of effort e, 0 ≤ s < 1 and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 a prolongation is expected to 
yield marginal losses, i.e. the ’smaller’ sign of (5) holds, if T=0. This means that salary 
costs exceed the expected returns, unless s = 1.  
Alternatively, T = 0 may be an interior solution that holds if x = 0 if ∂I/∂x < 0 in (7). In 
this case we get Fhv’ + q - (1 -s) S = 0 from (5) for all T = t.  Because h(o, e)= 0, which 
yields q - (1-s) S = 0. The returns from the 100% teaching load are needed to cover a 
reduced salary and the reduction factor can be computed as s = 1 - q/S. Although there is 
perhaps a contract, it is a teaching contract and actually no research contract as x = 0. To 
get a negative value of (7) we must have ∂I/∂x < 0. A look at (7) tells us that this requires a 
small value of F and U multiplied by v￿h1e
-hv(1-hv), the impact of research time on the 
probability density of success, and a strong negative impact of research time x on effort e. 
Seemingly, these are the expectations that the faculty has in regards to researchers not 
finishing in time. Before the constitutional change in the Netherlands, researchers had 




                                                                                                                                                                                                
10 The results of termination of the contract or prolongation with salary reduction are also possible outcomes in Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1983). Their model is different in that wages are only paid in case of successfully finished projects.    Thomas Ziesemer 
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In this paper we have captured the internal organization problem between a researcher 
and his employer that happens to occur when deadlines are not met. The problem is 
raised because of the Dutch governments’ willingness to pay for contributions to basic 
scientific research only in case of success. 
The main results of the model of this paper are the following:  
i) A higher labour time for research will decrease the researcher’s effort if a higher share 
of research time decreases the influence of higher effort levels on the probability density 
of success (hazard rate) [∂e/∂x < 0 if h21 < 0 (sufficient)]; 
ii) There is a negative impact of salary reduction on effort in the prolongation period if 
marginal disutility from effort is weakened by a higher salary [∂e/∂s < 0, if U21 < 0 
(sufficient)]; 
iii) Researchers’ effort is, ceteris paribus, decreasing over time because researchers 
optimally distribute effort inversely to the increasing cumulated probability of success 
(∂e/∂t < 0); 
iv) An optimal, finite contract prolongation length, a salary reduction and research time 
share may exist, which provide some rules of thumb for the administration of the 
institution. If a higher share of research time, x, increases the influence of higher effort on 
the probability density of success (hazard rate)  (∂e/∂x  > 0 by a positive and sufficiently 
strong value of h21) research time will be 100% (∂I/∂x  > 0) and the teaching load will be 
zero. If, however, ∂I/∂x < 0 the research time will be zero and no contract prolongation for 
research will be signed; 
v) If the salary reduction has higher benefits than cost to the employer (∂I/∂s > 0 for which 
a positive and sufficiently large U21 is sufficient) the salary will be set to zero; this can only 
be the case if the marginal utility of the researcher from his salary is very low.  
vi) Some of the implications of the decision of the economics faculty of Maastricht 
University to set the prolongation time equal to zero have been derived: i) Expected 
returns cannot cover a positive salary. ii) A positive salary can only be justified if they are 
fully covered by a 100% teaching load. The necessary assumptions behind this decision 
and revealed by our analysis are i) that effort is reduced with higher research time and ii) 





Given the general and qualitative character of the results, it may be desirable to 
choose more specific functions for the utility function and the hazard rate. This would 
allow making scenarios for the numerical outcomes of the time horizon, the teaching load, 
and the salary reduction, which would have to be specified in a contract. 
However, there may be possible extensions. One of them may be that the prize the 
employer gets can be thought of as not only consisting of money but also the value of a 
reputation for delivering in time, which might be a continuous function of the realized 
prolongation time, ⊗ . The employer than has stronger incentives to provide more research 
time. However, this may be the case with projects paid by political institutions but will 
hardly be the case in basic scientific research where the cost of violating deadlines is not 
perceived to be so obvious or serious, because it is a public good. 
The monopolistic character of a principal-agent relationship, which in this model 
allows the principal to increase the effort of the agent by choosing a salary reduction and 
the research time, is a market imperfection. The constitutional change that has shifted the 
rights for these choices to the employer thus has replaced a potential government 
imperfection into a monopolistic one. Regulators seem to believe that the former 
imperfection was larger than the latter one or, alternatively, the shift in the rights 
considered is just a by-product of other changes, which are held to be more important 
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List of abbreviations 
 
Zero  the period, at which researcher￿s regular contract expires and prolongation begins 
T  period as contract prolongation expires 
e  effort of researcher in period t 
x  labour time of researcher 
F  the prize for research success received by the employer (principal) if the 
researcher succeeds. 
P = 1 ￿ e
 -h(x,e)v(t)  probability function for research success (and e 
-hv for failure) 
with random time variable t, a concave function h, h1, h2 > 0, 
h11, h22 < 0, h21 >=< 0 and the following cases for v(t) (see 
Kamien/Schwarz, 1980): v(t) = t and v’ = 1 for the exponential 
distribution,  v(t) = (t)
w and v’ = w(t)
w-1 for the Weibull 
distribution and v(t) = e 
wt  - 1 and v’ = we 
wt 
p = h(x,e)v’(t)e 





p/(1-P) = hv’      generalized hazard rate (see Kamien/Schwarz, 1980): 
probability of successful research in t conditional on no 
research success until t. 
q        is the return of teaching activity. 
S  last full salary of the researcher during regular contract length 
(fixed by the government); thus, till zero. 
1 - s         percentage of full salary paid after t, completely used for  
                                           consumption. 
S (1-s)       salary costs to be attributed to research 
                                           employer’s expected return of F in t. 
U [(1-s) S, -e]    employee’s utility function with U1, U2 > 0, U22 < 0    
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0
) ( ) , ( ) ( ' ) , ( 
 
MERIT-Infonomics Research Memorandum series 
- 2001- 
 
2001-001  The Changing Nature of Pharmaceutical R&D - Opportunities for Asia? 
J￿rg C. Mahlich and Thomas Roediger-Schluga 
 
2001-002  The Stringency of Environmental Regulation and the 'Porter Hypothesis' 
Thomas Roediger-Schluga 
 
2001-003  Tragedy of the Public Knowledge 'Commons'? Global Science, Intellectual 
Property and the Digital Technology Boomerang 
Paul A. David 
 
2001-004  Digital Technologies, Research Collaborations and the Extension of Protection 
for Intellectual Property in Science: Will Building 'Good Fences' Really Make 
'Good Neighbors'? 
  Paul  A.  David 
 
2001-005  Expert Systems: Aspects of and Limitations to the Codifiability of Knowledge 
  Robin  Cowan 
 
2001-006  Monopolistic Competition and Search Unemployment: A Pissarides-Dixit-  
Stiglitz model 
  Thomas  Ziesemer 
 
2001-007  Random walks and non-linear paths in macroeconomic time series: Some 
evidence and implications 
    Franco Bevilacqua and Adriaan van Zon 
 
2001-008  Waves and Cycles: Explorations in the Pure Theory of Price for Fine Art 
  Robin  Cowan 
 
2001-009  Is the World Flat or Round? Mapping Changes in the Taste for Art 
  Peter  Swann 
 
2001-010  The Eclectic Paradigm in the Global Economy 
    John Cantwell and Rajneesh Narula 
 
2001-011  R&D Collaboration by 'Stand-alone' SMEs: opportunities and limitations in the 
ICT sector 
  Rajneesh  Narula 
 
2001-012  R&D Collaboration by SMEs: new opportunities and limitations in the face of 
globalisation 
  Rajneesh  Narula 
 
2001-013  Mind the Gap - Building Profitable Community Based Businesses on the 
Internet 
    Bernhard L. Krieger and Philipp S. M￿ller 
 
2001-014  The Technological Bias in the Establishment of a Technological Regime: the 
adoption and enforcement of early information processing technologies in US 
manufacturing, 1870-1930 
    Andreas Reinstaller and Werner H￿lzl 
 
2001-015  Retrieval of Service Descriptions using Structured Service Models 
    Rudolf M￿ller and Stefan M￿ller  
 
 
2001-016  Auctions - the Big Winner Among Trading Mechanisms for the Internet 
Economy 
  Rudolf  M￿ller 
 
2001-017  Design and Evaluation of an Economic Experiment via the Internet 
    Vital Anderhub, Rudolf M￿ller and Carsten Schmidt 
 
2001-018  What happens when agent T gets a computer? 
    Lex Borghans and Bas ter Weel 
 
2001-019  Manager to go? Performance dips reconsidered with evidence from Dutch 
football 
    Allard Bruinshoofd and Bas ter Weel 
 
2001-020  Computers, Skills and Wages 
    Lex Borghans and Bas ter Weel 
 
2001-021  Knowledge Transfer and the Services Sector in the Context of the New Economy 
    Robin Cowan, Luc Soete and Oxana Tchervonnaya 
 
2001-022  Stickiness of Commercial Virtual Communities 
    Rita Walczuch, Marcel  Verkuijlen, Bas Geus and Ursela Ronnen 
 
2001-023  Automatic ontology mapping for agent communication 
    F. Wiesman, N. Roos and P. Vogt 
 
2001-024  Multi Agent Diagnosis: an analysis 
    N. Roos, A. ten Teije, A. Bos and C. Witteveen 
 
2001-025  ICT as Technical Change in the Matching and Production Functions of a 
Pissarides-Dixit-Stiglitz model 
  Thomas  Ziesemer 
 
2001-026  Economic stagnation in Weimar Germany: A structuralist perspective 
  Thorsten  H.  Block 
 
2001-027  Intellectual property rights in a knowledge-based economy 
  E l a d   H a r i s o n  
 
2001-028  Protecting the digital endeavour: prospects for intellectual property rights in the 
information society 
  E l a d   H a r i s o n  
 
2001-029  A Simple Endogenous Growth Model With Asymmetric Employment 
Opportunities by Skill 
  Adriaan  van  Zon 
 
2001-030  The impact of education and mismatch on wages: The Netherlands, 1986 - 1998 
    Joan Muysken and Jennifer Ruholl 
 
2001-031  The Workings of Scientific Communities 
    Robin Cowan and Nicolas Jonard 
 
2001-032  An Endogenous Growth Model à la Romer with Embodied Energy-Saving 
Technological Change 





2001-033  How Innovative are Canadian Firms Compared to Some European Firms? A 
Comparative Look at Innovation Surveys 
    Pierre Mohnen and Pierre Therrien 
 
2001-034  On The Variance of Market Innovation with the Number of Firms 
  Robin  Cowan 
 
2001-035  Non linear dynamics in US macroeconomic time series 
  Franco  Bevilacqua 
 
2001-036  Multinational Firms, Regional Integration and Globalising Markets: 
Implications for Developing Countries 
  Rajneesh  Narula 
 
2001-037  CONTRACT PROLONGATION IN INNOVATION PRODUCTION AS A 
PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM WITH MORAL HAZARD 






























Papers can be purchased at a cost of EURO 7 or USD 7 per report at the following address: 
 
MERIT - P.O. Box 616 - 6200 MD Maastricht - The Netherlands - Fax : -31-43-388 4905 
(* Surcharge of EURO 7 or USD 7 for banking costs will be added for orders from abroad) 
 
Subscription: the yearly rate for the MERIT-INFONOMICS Research Memorandum series is EURO 
150 or USD 150 or, 
papers can be downloaded from INTERNET: 
 
http://meritbbs.unimaas.nl 
http://www.infonomics.nl 
 
email: secr-merit@merit.unimaas.nl 
 